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Problems with Musical Signification: Following 
the Rules and Grasping Mental States
Marianela Calleja
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Argentina
Abstract. The reflections on music are crucial in the philosophy of language and the 
mind of the second Wittgenstein. These reflections go around the comparisons Wittgen-
stein did between meaning and understanding language, and meaning and understand-
ing music. Musical passages show a language as independent from reality, i.e. objects, 
events or mental states, centered instead in intonations, conclusions, parenthesis, confir-
mations, questions and answers, a phenomenon enough studied in musicology.
Two interpretations on the signification of musical meaning are analyzed: Ahonen’s 
formalist view [2005], based in the following of rules, and Scruton’s expressive view 
[2004], based on the comparison between the intuitive recognition of a mental state 
“hidden” behind the facial expressions. As a conclusion we arrive to a mixed argument: 
Either of the alternatives whether annulling the other, are possibly telling about Witt-
genstein’s conception but do not elucidate the problem itself.
Keywords. Musical signification, Musical Language, Wittgenstein, Ahonen, Scruton.
And why should not the musical experience 
embrace feeling and evocation just as much as 
pure structured sound?
Scruton, Programme Music
In Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication 
(2005), Finnish philosopher Hanne Ahonen confronts Roger Scru-
ton in his paper on Wittgenstein and the Understanding of Music 
(2004), under the idea that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was 
imbued with his reflections on music and that these thoughts were 
inspired by the formalist «Brahmsian musical circles of Vienna» 
(Ahonen [2005]: 515), contrary to the expressive reading Scruton 
made of Wittgenstein, about understanding a piece of music «only if 
you imaginatively grasp the state of mind expressed by it» (Scruton 
[2004]: 1). Here a position which concedes the force of the evidence 
that Wittgenstein would defend a pragmatist, yet formalist theory 
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of musical meaning, according to Ahonen, com-
bines with the search for a comprehensive descrip-
tion of what is involved when we appreciate music 
by understanding it. Understanding music could 
reconcile a formal perspective, in Wittgenstein’s 
terms of «following rules», and an expressive per-
spective, i.e. «grasping mental states» by «bringing 
up the commonplace intuition of facial expres-
sions as reflections of first-person knowledge of 
“what it is like”» (Ahonen [2005]: 514). The last 
assumption is supported by recent results brought 
up in neuromusicological research.
We will divide the analysis firstly in a historical 
account about the relationship between music and 
language, then we will focus onto a more analyti-
cal account, and enter into syntactist, semantist and 
pragmatist views on musical language. Finally, a 
pragmatist view, as we will interpret it, could cover 
both formal and expressive aspects as developed in 
today’s philosophy of music.
1. MUSIC AND LANGUAGE
The question of signification or meaning in 
music requires the study of a position around 
the topic of music and language. It should firstly 
answer the questions of what the historical rela-
tionships between them were, and secondly, 
whether music is language in an analytical sense. 
Music has been dependent on language from ear-
ly on; at the same time it came to be considered 
a “language” in its own terms. In this last context, 
philosophies of language provide a framework to 
decide a notion of music as language.
The relation of music with language can be 
found explicitly formulated for the first time in the 
Baroque, in the use of rhetorical classical forms as 
a framework for inventing, structuring, embellish-
ing, and even delivering music (the inventio-dis-
positio-elocutio or decoratio-memoria-pronunciatio 
from the Greco-Roman tradition of rhetorics) (see 
Blake [2001]; Buelow [1966]; Borgerding [1998]). 
From this point onwards, other aspects are crucial 
for understanding the sustained exchange between 
music and language: linguistic contents were imi-
tated by music in different ways ‒ “word painting”, 
imitation music ‒, the model of literary narrativity 
was assimilated (Tarasti [1994]: 138-180; Tarasti 
[2002]: 112-115), and a similar sense of abstrac-
tion was reached.
The historical process of the relations between 
music and language could be summarised in four 
steps:
1. Music emulates linguistic manners, being asso-
ciated with rhetorics.
2. Music emulates language in that it can refer to 
contents outside itself (imitation music).
3. Music emulates the narrative of language 
(“programme music”, but also “absolute 
music”). 
4. Music can reach abstraction, in the sense of 
being separated from an extrinsic reference 
and play with its own elements in a formal 
way (musical formalism).
In addition to the historical relations music had 
with language, the conception of music as language 
deserves an analytical treatment. Roger Scruton 
presents one in his Aesthetics of Music ([1997]: 171-
210). Scruton asks if an analogy with language or 
the search for a grammar would cast any light on a 
theory of musical understanding. His answer is “no”; 
the arguments that lead him to such a result will 
be discussed in next section and serve as introduc-
tory both for understanding his expressive position, 
Ahonen’s later criticism, and our comprehensive con-
clusion in defence of an enhanced formalism.
2. MUSIC AS LANGUAGE
According to Scruton’s philosophy of music, 
whether music is a language or not will strictly 
depend on finding identical conditions that lan-
guage needs in order to be called as such: sub-
stitution rules, transformation rules and syntax 
linked to a semantic goal (Scruton [1997]: 174, 
177). Here, different theories of signification in 
the philosophy of language should be presented in 
order to test their results in relation to the prob-
lem of musical signification. The vision of music 
as language will vary depending on the notion of 
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language one is considering, such as the picture 
theory of language, semantic-oriented, or the the-
ory of language as expressive, pragmatic-oriented.
2.1. Syntactist Approach to Musical Language
In 2005, Ahonen criticised Scruton’s psycholo-
gist, expressive interpretation of the philosophy of 
musical signification based on Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy of language. However, Scruton’s inter-
pretation in 2004 was much based on the primary 
reflections on music and understanding from his 
Aesthetics from 1997.
According to Scruton, the wrongness of assim-
ilating syntactic structures to music resides in the 
absence of any link between syntax and seman-
tics; whereas in language syntax and semantics go 
hand in hand. The meaning of the music is not 
provided by the syntactic order but by the acoustic 
sensation provoked by the music.
“Syntax” informs us whether a sentence is a 
possible sentence of the language, which of its 
component sounds is a word rather than a pho-
neme, and how the words are linked. On the oth-
er hand, “semantics” tells us whether a sentence 
has meaning and what the meaning is. Scruton 
goes on to explain that a theory of syntax would 
explain how we can derive sentences of the lan-
guage, by finite transformational rules, from a 
finite vocabulary and a repertoire of deep struc-
tures. We recognise syntactically correct sentences 
by grasping their derivation; deviant sentences are 
those that we cannot derive from the repertoire of 
rules and structures.
According to the Chomskian model, syntax 
is generative, and not merely consists of “rules of 
substitution” (syntagmatic structures). “Transfor-
mation rules” generate surface structures from 
underlying “deep” structures. Transformation rules 
explain our ways of grouping words in a sentence; 
they also explain how we hear the sentence. From 
the sentence: «That he was angry was evident 
from the way he frowned», we hear the first «was» 
less far from «angry» than the second «was». This 
is because we hear the first clause, a noun phrase, 
as grouped together.
 Scruton shows consequently that our rules of 
grammar must take into account more than the 
surface position of a word to generate a natu-
ral language. The point is illustrated as well by 
reflecting on the intransitivity of syntax. A word 
may be acceptably joined to its successor and the 
successor to its successor, and the result may be 
ill formed, e.g. «Fish eat three ideas». Accord-
ing to Scruton, this may have a parallel in music 
too. In Paul Hindemith’s Gebrauchmusik, there 
is an example where each bar leads smoothly to 
its successor, but the whole is non-sensical: for 
example, in the Concerto for trumpet, bassoon 
and string orchestra (1949) (see Scruton [1997]: 
179). From this situation however, a conse-
quence can still be derived that there are indeed 
intuitions of right and wrong that can equally be 
shown in music.
But for the analogy with functions of language, 
one should provide a rule-governed syntax for all 
dimensions of musical organisation: that is, for 
rhythm, for melody, and for harmony. Scruton 
examines a first case in which a metrical pattern is 
interrupted by a syntactical incorrectness. Then, a 
second case in which, substituting a falling fourth 
in a melodic syntactically correct example, we feel 
the pressure of redefining the other consecutive 
“slots” in the melody. Similarly with harmony, one 
could find also a kind of rule-governed order. Giv-
en a certain melody, a bass-line could be derived 
directly according to its tonality.
Scruton remarks that these intuitions of right 
and wrong in music remind us of those which the 
linguist tries to explain through a transformational 
grammar. Consequently, he concedes at this point 
of the analysis the following facts:
1. There are infinite utterances in music, but con-
structed from a finite (discontinuous) vocabu-
lary, i.e. the twelve semitones.
2. Music implies a cognitive process in which we 
pay attention and every element is understood 
in relation to the whole.
3. There is a context-dependent affinity between 
tones, more than a step-by-step substitution 
of syntactically equivalent elements. Music is 
organised, but sui generis, through variations, 
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imitations, parallels, and structural and pro-
longing episodes.
4. There is a “chunking of information” in music; 
groups of tones, beats, and harmonies are per-
ceived as forming a unit, as words forming a 
sentence.
5. In music, memory plays an important role, 
aiding the recognition of the structure as a 
whole.
6. And there are in fact intuitions that suggest a 
“generative” explanation. How music is heard 
leads to a hypothesis of how it is derived. His 
example is: in Debussy’s opening bars to his 
Pelléas et Mélisande [1898], the chord in meas-
ure 5 should be derived from a whole-tone 
scale (D–E–F#–Ab–Bb–C). 
According to Scruton, a generative theory 
of tonal music should offer the following “intui-
tions” as primary evidence. We could develop 
with these intuitions, as a linguist does, a theory 
that would explain those patterns that sound right 
and exclude those that sound wrong. It would be a 
theory of musical understanding par excellence; it 
would show how and what we should understand:
1. Horizontal grouping into phrases or melodies 
and vertical grouping into chords. 
2. Metrical intuitions.
3. Melodic intuitions, how a melody splits into 
episodes which elaborate, answer, or continue.
4. Intuitions concerning tension and relaxation 
or the presence of unsaturated chords requir-
ing a completion. 
5. Intuitions concerning the part-whole relation-
ship, episodes either answering each other or 
being independent.
In musicology, Lerdahl and Jackendoff ’s 
Chomskian inspired work A Generative Theory 
of Tonal Music (1983) distinguishes two kinds 
of grammatical rules: those that specify when a 
given complex is well formed («formation rules») 
and those that specify the preferred or favoured 
musical structures («preference rules»). They 
emphasise however the importance of the second 
type while they marginalise the concept of «well-
formedness», which is the equivalent to syntax in 
formal languages.
Lerdahl and Jackendoff propose four struc-
tures in tonal music according to grouping, meter, 
the organisation of pitches according to their 
structural importance, and the order of tension 
and release. They constitute hierarchies, which 
derive perceivable musical phenomena from 
underlying structures, in the same manner that 
the word order in a sentence is derived from the 
deep structure of rules of transformation. The first 
step in a transformational grammar is the design 
of trees (see Chomsky [1986]). They construct 
similar trees to explain which musical elements 
are heard as subordinate to which. The analysis 
has the following layers:
1. The grouping structure: divides the piece into 
motifs, phrases, and sections hierarchically in 
a tree diagram.
2. The metrical structure: divides between strong 
and weak beats at various levels into the 
grouping structure.
3. The «time-span reduction»: assigns a hierarchy 
of structural importance to the pitches.
4. A «prolongational reduction»: derives the 
tension and relaxation of the harmonic and 
melodic elements hierarchically, from an 
underlying harmonic and melodic structure 
(equivalent to the Schenkerian Ursatz) (see 
Pankhurst [2008]).
Each structure is characterised by «preference 
rules», rules which, for example, tell about the 
preference of the event leading to the more sta-
ble metrical order, as the most important event 
(or «head») in a time-span. The corollary from 
this enterprise is that there are «musical univer-
sals» and that it is innate for humans to recognise 
them. However, according to Scruton, we should 
hesitate to call this a theory of musical syntax, for 
the rules do not determine any musical surface 
uniquely. This is because preference rules can con-
flict. It is impossible to think of these rules as pro-
cedures which one might obey: the listener acts in 
accordance with these rules, but not from them.
By the way, Lerdahl and Jackendoff admit that 
preference rules have no parallel in natural lan-
guage because the rules are precisely obeyed in 
language, at least in normal discourse, but with 
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possible exceptions in literature. The problem of 
preference rules touches the nature of Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff ’s enterprise.
Moreover, the reduction acquires a tree struc-
ture familiar to generative theories of syntax. The 
same authors admit also that this is misleading, 
since linguistic syntactic trees relate to gram-
matical categories, which are absent in music. In 
music, on the contrary, it is the individual events 
that are hierarchically related.
The principal question for Scruton is whether 
a theory of tonal music conceived in cognitive sci-
ence terms would really show how we understand 
tonal music. Scruton presents his arguments for 
diminishing the power of the generative theory 
in music. Each of the four reductions proposed 
by the theory offers to explain our experience of 
sequence: why this sounds right after that. How-
ever, he regards counterpoint as just as important. 
We can affirm for example that a chord heard 
in the second voice of a canon is right, being 
acknowledged that here is first a matter of musical 
expectation, and not of derivation.
Likewise, he considers the «prolongational 
reduction», where a portion of music is derived 
from its cadence. Scruton notes that we can treat 
a passage as subordinate to a cadence only because 
we perceive the temporal Gestalt. The basic experi-
ences involved in hearing music, recognising par-
allels, movement, and force are not explained by 
the hierarchical theory of the piece’s structure, but 
assumed by it. Scruton’s example is Franz Schu-
bert’s first «Suleika» song (1821): at the beginning, 
three measures displaying an ambiguous G sev-
enth chord arrive at the dominant F# of B minor 
in the cadence; the situation he wants to explain 
is that we already hear B minor in the first three 
measures. By the way, Lerdahl and Jackendoff also 
admitted that they could not explain parallelism. 
He concludes: «A prior conception of the musi-
cal Gestalt is therefore required before the genera-
tive theory of prolongation can get off the ground» 
(Scruton [1997]: 196).
Finally, the theory does not mention the key 
component of the grouping phenomenon: the 
experience of movement, i.e. of phrases beginning, 
moving on, and coming to an end, and the expe-
rience of metaphorical space in which this move-
ment spreads. Scruton appeals here to his main 
thesis:
To notice the movement in music, you must perceive 
the notes not merely organised into groups, but as 
moving; and that means perceiving the music under 
an irreducible metaphor [...]. A generative theory of 
grouping is necessarily blind to this fact: it can, per-
haps, explain the grouping; but it cannot explain the 
metaphor ‒ nor the fact that this is how the music is 
heard. (Scruton [1997]: 197)
Concerning the status of musical rules and 
the way in which they shape musical practice, he 
arrives at the following conclusions: 
1. The order that we hear in music may be lik-
ened to, but it is not, truly syntactical. It 
resembles the order of style in language, 
although it is less independent.
2. There are rules in music but they are not usu-
ally prescriptive, they are derived post facto; 
generalisations instead of rules of grammar.
3. There are no parts of speech in music, no syn-
tactic elements playing a single specifiable 
role. In music, as in language, it is only in the 
whole context of the utterance that any ele-
ment has meaning. But in music, unlike lan-
guage, the contribution is not and cannot be 
constant.
4. In language, speaker and hearer have the same 
competence. In music, the composer must 
have the hearer’s competence, but he must also 
have much more than this if his music is to 
be meaningful. A generative grammar of ton-
al music would not tell us how tonal music is 
composed.
5. Rule-governed music is, in general, vacuous 
and uninteresting. 
We could discuss the scope of Scruton’s argu-
ments 1 and 4. The first one, about the style in 
language as more independent than the musical 
one, is doubtful. And regarding the argument 4, 
about speaker and listener’s having the same com-
petence, it seems that Scruton should moderate 
these conclusions.
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2.2 The Semantist Approach to Musical Language
As a second stage, Scruton elaborates another 
claim, perhaps the stronger one, to criticise Ler-
dahl and Jackendoff ’s theory. It is based on the 
assumption that a coherent conception of deep 
structure in natural language is linked to a seman-
tic interpretation of it. Even in formal languages, 
syntax is modelled on an implicit interpretation. 
And there is no way in which we could build a 
theory of language syntax without depending on 
intuitions about the meaning of words.
This means that music could be described 
syntactically only if we could propose a musical 
semantics. According to Scruton, the weakness of 
the semiological approach (see Monelle [1992]) 
resides in its inability to combine syntax and 
semantics into a unitary theory. Music has a qua-
si-syntactic structure and also a kind of meaning. 
But there is no reason to believe that its structure 
is the vehicle of meaning.
According to Scruton, we could still think of 
music as having a semantic value, only if we could 
signal the meaning of a piece from the meanings 
of its elements. We should search for a musical 
equivalent to a vocabulary: phrases, harmonies, 
progressions, and so on, with a repeatable signifi-
cance that regularly and predictably contributes 
to the meaning of the musical whole (see Cooke 
[1959]).
For Scruton, meaning is assigned by percep-
tion, not by convention in the case of music; a 
case completely unlike language. And through 
an example he shows how rivalling semantic 
meanings could be assigned to music (e.g. Schu-
bert’s «Rückblick», Winterreise [1828]). Scruton’s 
question is whether the set of phrases and ges-
tures have the same standard meaning for those 
who are competent to deploy them, regardless of 
any accompanying text. The absence of parts of 
speech implies that there are no clear procedures 
for deriving a semantic interpretation of a whole 
phrase or movement from the interpretation of its 
parts. Instead, music simply accumulates mean-
ing without an articulate structure. Expressive 
meaning is chiefly context dependent and irreduc-
ible to laws. The constancy of meaning cannot be 
assumed, and the process of accumulation changes 
unpredictably the significance of each “syntacti-
cal” part. He concludes: «Who would say that the 
move from the minor sixth to the dominant in the 
minor key means the same in Alberich’s lament 
(Wagner, Rheingold, scene I), and in Mozart’s 
Fortieth Symphony, K. 550 (opening)?» (Scru-
ton [1997]: 206-207). The hypothesis of semantic 
structure in music as literal truth is for Scruton 
unsustainable.
The constancy of meaning which is a fact 
found in tonal tradition must be explained how-
ever. The apparent musical vocabulary is the out-
come of a long tradition of «making and match-
ing», and his rules of meaning are really habits of 
taste (see Thompson, Quinto [2011]: 361). Follow-
ing Scruton’s arguments, music has neither truly 
syntactic nor semantic structure. He remembers 
Nelson Goodman and Suzanne Langer who nota-
bly presented the category of symbol systems 
without semantic structure, symbols that present 
their subject matter directly. Their intention was 
to formulate a concept of symbolism that would 
allow us to speak of music (and other art forms) 
as signs, while denying that they describe what 
they signify, as language does.
Scruton arrives at the conclusion that there are 
no rules that guarantee expression, even if a back-
ground of rule-guidedness may be necessary for 
the highest expressive effects. Rules have a different 
role from the grammatical rules of language; if you 
rewrite the rules then you can change the possibili-
ties of expression. All this would lead to the topic 
of the aesthetic experience. He believes that finally 
the linguistic analogy in the case of music is more 
of a metaphor than a simile and although it is not 
useless, it is anyway not appropriate for founding a 
theory of musical understanding.
The analyses made by Scruton hide a particu-
lar conception of language, which comes from 
the semantist school of philosophy of language 
of the 20th century (see Lenci-Sandu [2008]). 
Before leaving this analytical inquiry on music as 
language, a different notion of language will be 
approached, which presumably helps.
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2.3 The Pragmatist View
Jerrold Levinson claims ‒ in his article Musical 
Thinking (2003) ‒ for music the same association 
with thought that one usually attributes to lan-
guage. He begins by remembering here how music 
served the late Wittgenstein for speaking about 
our deep constitution in language: «Here it is as 
if a conclusion were being drawn» (Wittgenstein 
[1953]: 182); «You can point to particular places 
in a tune by Schubert and say: look, that is the 
point of this tune, this is where the thought comes 
to a head» (Wittgenstein [1980]: 47e). Again in 
Culture and Value:
If I say for instance: here it’s as though a conclusion 
were being drawn, here as though someone were 
expressing agreement, or as though this were a reply 
to what came before, ‒ my understanding of it pre-
supposes my familiarity with conclusions, expressions 
of agreement, replies. (Wittgenstein [1980]: 52e)
Levinson provides inspiring passages from 
Wittgenstein’s different categories for speaking 
about music as thoughtful activity:
[E]mbodied thinking in music is thinking we ascribe 
to the music, as something it appears to be doing, and 
has no identifiable object, whereas implied thinking in 
regard to music is thinking we ascribe to the compos-
er, and has a quite definite object, namely the evolv-
ing composition itself. [...] [Intrinsic thinking] may 
reside instead in the mere succession from chord to 
chord, motive to motive, or phrase to phrase at every 
point in any intelligible piece of music, whether or not 
there is any suggestion of recognisable extramusical 
action, or any implication of specific compositional 
deliberation. (Levinson [2003]: 2.10, 2.11)
Now, the turn from searching for the question 
of meaning in language in its semantics to search-
ing for its meaning in pragmatics, means that one 
is passing from believing that grammar is under-
lied by reality (the object), to rather a belief that 
the meaning of language is formed by conventions 
and practices, such as in the following example: 
«Can he speak?», whether it is asked of the parents 
of a child or of the family of an ill person. Accord-
ing to the first period of Wittgenstein’s thought, 
the Tractatus, the question would appear mysteri-
ous, intangible, abstract; according to the second 
period, the Philosophical Investigations, its signifi-
cance would be given by its use in an act of com-
munication (the person would be asking if the 
little child is already able to speak, or whether a 
patient is in condition to speak) (see Malcolm 
[1986]). In music, like language in this particular 
pragmatic-oriented sense, there is no grammar, no 
content that has to be deciphered, but outwardly 
responses and capacities (gestures, apt compari-
sons, hummings, and movings). In Levinson’s own 
words:
Both music and language are forms of thought. 
Understanding music should therefore be analogous 
to understanding language. The former, like the latter, 
is a matter of use, that is, of knowing how to operate 
with the medium in question in particular commu-
nicative games, in particular contexts. But knowing 
how in regard to music, as with knowing how gener-
ally, does not consist in propositional knowledge but 
rather in behavioral and experiential abilities and dis-
positions. Hence if music is thought we should natu-
rally come to understand it as we come to understand 
thought in words; not by learning how to decode or 
decipher it, but by learning how to respond to it 
appropriately and how to connect it to and ground it 
in our lives. (Levinson [2003]: 2. 16)
3. THE PROBLEM 
An overview of the history of the relations 
between music and language (section 1) and the 
analytical investigation on their strict analogy 
(sections 2.1, 2.2. and 2.3), produced, seeming-
ly, independent results. The first part dealt with 
some general ways in which music has related to 
language through history: music has been seen as 
imitating the “procedures” of language, as attempt-
ing to “represent” in the way language or paint-
ing did, as following the narrative structure of the 
linguistic discourse and, finally, reaching “abstrac-
tion”. These are just the philosophical reasons 
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which, on the other hand, support what a cogni-
tive analysis is testing nowadays based on neu-
ropsychological studies: language and music share, 
although not entirely, systems of the brain.
Music appears to mimic some of the features of lan-
guage and to convey some of the same emotions that 
vocal communication does, but in a nonreferential, 
and nonspecific way. It also invokes some of the same 
neural regions that language does, but far more than 
language, music taps into primitive brain structures 
involved with motivation, reward, and emotion. (Lev-
itin [2006]: 187)
From the philosophical analyses about music 
and language some results can be extracted: there 
must be a limit in the association of a syntax and 
semantics in the case of music, but music can be 
considered to be in the same boat with language 
understood in a pragmatic sense in that it suppos-
es a meaningful act of communication: embody-
ing, implying, and intrinsically involving thought.
Sanz González’s article (2001) helps here to 
join music aesthetic tendencies with the differ-
ent theories of the philosophy of language. In this 
way, historical currents in musical aesthetics could 
be seen in parallel with different theories of signi-
fication born from the study of natural language.
In very general terms, Sanz González juxta-
poses Baroque music constructed around rhe-
torical principles, with an aesthetic of imitation, 
in the sense of an imitation of the natural emo-
tions; Romanticism with an expressive aesthetics, 
expression of the individual emotions of the artist; 
contemporary music tends to avoid the notion of 
music as referential, either of conventional or pri-
vate emotions or of any natural scene or descrip-
tion, thus it is compared to a formalist aesthetic, 
the signification of music being found in the 
music itself, in its own ways of organising.
These theories of musical signification (imita-
tion, expression, and formalism) were revisited by 
Sanz González in relation with the “referential-
ist”, “intentionalist”, and “semantist” theories of 
language. A referential theory of language finds a 
basic relation between the noun and the named ‒ 
an object. As it describes a relation of imitation, 
its counterpart in musical aesthetics would be the 
aesthetics of imitation. The intentionalist believes 
that language is the mere outward manifestation 
of the internal consciousness consequently failing 
to explain intersubjective knowledge. Its counter-
part in musical aesthetics would be the aesthetics 
of expression. A semantist, unlike the ancient ref-
erential theory, maintains that the minimum unity 
of signification is not the noun but the proposi-
tion. The proposition reflects a fact in the world 
(picture theory of language); this vision implies 
an analytical study of the parts of the proposition. 
According to Sanz González, formalism in music 
is associated with this vision for studying the rela-
tion of the parts of the composition. But yet for 
semantist philosophers, the reference outside the 
world of the sentences they analyse is crucial for 
the epistemic goal of language. A crucial differ-
ence is that for the musical formalist, the significa-
tion is however internal to the musical work. Note 
that this view, which associates semantist theories 
of language and formalism in musical aesthetics 
is in opposition with Ahonen’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s late pragmatism as linked to a musi-
cal formalism as presented below.
In addition to these, Sanz González states that 
the philosophy of language offers the pragmatist 
theory of language. For this last one, signification 
is neither associated with an external object or 
with facts, nor to an internal consciousness, but 
resides in the use of the words in different situa-
tions. For this reason, signification is dynamic 
and open. Pragmatism would allow, in the case 
of music, an explanation for how symbolic quali-
ties of sounds function. These symbolic qualities 
are those that add the value of “joy” or “sadness” 
to certain sonic combinations, are shared, and are 
not illusory, but are also distinct from those inher-
ent to pitch (high/low), duration (long/short), 
intensity (loud/soft), and timbre. They function as 
certain rules which are current in a community, 
as rules of taste and of a practice. It is a matter of 
use, again, that determines their significance.
The interpretation offered by Sanz González 
about the goodness of a pragmatist approach to 
musical signification in terms of symbolism asso-
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ciated to values helps in reading the problem 
of musical significance in depth. This last read-
ing allows to join Ahonen’s (formalist) and Scru-
ton’s (expressive) views. Ahonen’s thesis about 
pragmatism in music alone would lead us to an 
explanation of how musical communication is 
possible, sharing the same rules in a game of lan-
guage according to a public criteria; Scruton’s 
thesis about pragmatism in music will lead to an 
intuitive understanding of how we perceive it, also 
linked, although partially, to intentionalist and 
solipsist interpretations since, undoubtedly there 
is certain constancy of meaning shared. However, 
neither Ahonen nor Scruton can give a complete 
account of musical signification, in that we need 
rules and aesthetic appreciation together. Recon-
ciliation of both interpretations lead us in a thesis 
already called enhanced formalism (See Alperson 
[2004]).
After studying some key issues in the problem 
in general, we must read again the controversy 
brought at the beginning between the works by 
Ahonen and Scruton in terms of explaining the 
problem of musical signification either as a ques-
tion of following rules or grasping mental states.
Ahonen’s criticism to Scruton is based on the 
interpretation extracted from Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy that is strict and not deviated into 
expressive or psychological contents. When Scru-
ton interprets Wittgenstein, he emphasised the 
fact that «you can be looking outwards and yet 
gaining first-person knowledge», «search for a 
meaning beyond the immediate Gestalt»; finally, 
this search leads the listener to experience with-
in his «first-person perspective a state of mind 
that is not own» (Scruton [2004]: 7-9). A simi-
lar approach is at the base of actual research on 
neuromusicology: the thesis of mimicry and its 
empiric base in the mirror neurons (see Robinson 
[2016]).
In several occasions Wittgenstein feeds this idea 
of an internal reference about musical meaning:
The same strange illusion which we are under when 
we seem to seek something which a face expresses 
whereas, in reality, we are giving ourselves up to the 
features before us ‒ the same illusion possesses us 
even more strongly if repeating a tune to ourselves 
and letting it make its full impression on us, we say: 
«This tune says something» and it is as though I had 
to find what it says. And if, recognizing this, I resign 
myself to saying «It just expresses a musical thought», 
this would mean no more than saying «It expresses 
itself». (Wittgenstein [1964]: 166)
In his Notebooks 1914-1916, parallel to his 
working on the Tractatus, Wittgenstein also 
reveals a formalist understanding of music: «A 
tune is a kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; 
it satisfies itself» (Wittgenstein [1961a]: 40). Also, 
he shows the same conception already working in 
his later philosophy:
It has sometimes been said that what music conveys 
to us are feelings of joyfulness, melancholy, triumph, 
etc., etc. and what repels us in this account is that 
it seems to say that music is an instrument for pro-
ducing in us sequence of feelings. And from this one 
might gather that any other means of producing such 
feelings would do for us instead of music. To such an 
account we are tempted to reply «Music conveys to us 
itself !» (Wittgenstein [1964]: 178)
The defence Ahonen made of her thesis is aid-
ed by a thorough analysis and counter attack of 
the following objections, as posited by Scruton:
1. Unlike in the case of natural language, we 
cannot take the ability to follow the rules of music 
as the criterion of understanding it, because listen-
ing is not an activity of the relevant kind (Ahonen 
[2005]: 520). 
On the contrary, according to Ahonen, Witt-
genstein brings musical examples since his idea is 
that the ability to make judgements in aesthetics is 
directly linked to learning the rules of the art in 
question. Of course this implies different degrees, 
as for example with the “counterpoint” case: to 
define the term, to identify a musical passage con-
taining it, to be able to write a few bars of a con-
trapuntal structure, up to improvising. Wittgen-
stein also was thinking about what musicologists 
largely developed around the phenomenon expe-
rienced from the hierarchical tonal scale: implica-
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tions, expectations, etc. He had the opinion that if 
one does not know that a dominant must be fol-
lowed by a tonic degree he/she would not be able 
to experience the “question” in music. Familiarity 
with rules, as when one expresses discontent with 
a passage that does not harmonize, lead us presup-
pose there is a point in understanding associated 
to these rules. “Whistling” is, for example, Witt-
genstein’s favourite for explaining the familiarity 
with the rules of music.
2. Many listeners have not studied music theo-
ry, and cannot explain what they hear in theoreti-
cal terms (Ahonen [2005]: 524).
Ahonen ascribes this critique to the fact that 
Scruton is supporting a chomskian, universal-
ist view on language and that is untenable to 
be transported to music. In section 1 we already 
explained why. However, according to Ahonen, 
one does not have to explain the rules in terms of 
consciously understanding the grammar; they are 
tacit knowledge. This does not imply however, that 
knowing the grammar does not allow us to under-
standing better the language. Ahonen moderates 
the argumentation and accepts that musical prac-
tice do not only implies knowing structural prop-
erties of the language but also to reproduce the 
fine nuances in a performance, described “meta-
phorically” in emotional and figurative terminol-
ogy.
3.  Explaining musical meaning and under-
standing in terms of rules does not do justice to 
the creative aspect of music. (Ahonen [2005]: 526)
Wittgenstein was aware that composers do not 
change the rules every time. This does not mean 
there is no creativity. In Philosophical Investiga-
tions (§203) he refers to language as a «labyrinth 
of paths» which does not prescribe which path 
one should take, although it makes movement 
possible.
4.  The fact that people use mental terminol-
ogy, emotional terminology in specific, when they 
describe music shows that the meaning of music is 
somehow related to mental states (Ahonen [2005]: 
527).
Ahonen gives a clear example: «[I]f we are 
looking for criteria of understanding music, gen-
eral claims like describing Chopin’s Etude op. 
10 no. 12 as conveying a mental state of “wild 
despair”, “resignation to one’s fate”, “passionate 
love”, or “controlled anger” seem all equally plau-
sible» (Ahonen [2005]: 528). The problem is that 
their role as criteria for understanding is less 
central. Another reason is that musical mean-
ings should be suitably explained through musical 
means (see Robinson [1994]).
CONCLUSIONS
As it happens with questions of authority, 
whether Wittgenstein said one or the other thing, 
it all finally ends arising problems at the funda-
mental strata. The fundamental question asked by 
this paper is: Can we determine one or the other 
interpretation as prevalent when it comes to music 
understanding? The answer here is: no. Under-
standing music (musical signification) is possible 
when both following the rules and (inevitably) 
grasping mental states (arousal of feelings) occur 
in the mind of a listener. Meaning, although it is 
not beyond (as Idealism in music would posit), 
nor behind (as an expressive account would posit), 
is a complex but articulated phenomena of agree-
ment in the rules (as a necessary condition) but 
the rules are inextricably intertwined with forms 
of life, which can be translated in Scruton’s sense 
as mental states and consequently, in tastes. It is 
rather dubious that Ahonen only searched into 
Scruton’s opinions in 2004 at the moment of writ-
ing the paper on musical understanding. In his 
entry to “Absolute music”, Scruton had however 
the idea that:
The advocacy of absolute music has brought with it 
a view of musical understanding that is as question-
able as anything written by Lizst in defence of the 
symphonic poem. It is of course absurd to suppose 
that one understands Smetana’s Vltava primarily by 
understanding what it “means”. For that seems to 
imply that the grasp of the melody, development, har-
mony and musical relations are all subordinate to a 
message that could have been expressed as well in 
words. But so too is it absurd to suppose that one has 
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understood a Bach fugue when one has a grasp of all 
the structural relations that exist among its parts. The 
understanding listener is not a computer. The logic of 
Bach’s fugues must be heard: it is understood in expe-
rience and not in thought. And why should not the 
musical experience embrace feeling and evocation just 
as much as pure structured sound? (Scruton [2001a])
Wittgenstein was interpreted in linguistic 
domains as for example in Davidson’s neoprag-
matism. This last philosopher speaks of mean-
ing in terms of uses as effects or actions (David-
son [1978]). Curiously, whenever one wants to 
inquiry into musical meaning, uses and customs 
are hidden under formalist conceptions of the 
type Ahonen defended, although this tradition 
goes back to Hanslick [1854]. As a conclusion, 
the framework here presented should prevent us 
from being puzzled by the narrowness of language 
– albeit this being a very wittgensteinian opinion 
– while in the process of accounting for musical 
signification. 
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